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THROUGH THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
INTRODUCTION
S INGLE STROKES of the government's pen can seldom alone accomplish
social goals. To insure vitality, legislation requires review, revision
and amendment. Though worthy of praise for initial and continuing con-
tributions towards social betterment, the Civil Rights Act of 19641 falls into
this classification. Its scope is too narrow because it fails to include a signifi-
cant group of persons sorely in need of its protection. This legislation needs
the depth evoked by its title rather than the limitations of its present lan-
guage. Amendment is required to protect the rights of the physically and
mentally handicapped.
Areas in which the handicapped person's rights have either been in-
fringed upon or denied completely include: "forced sterilization, ... re-
striction on the rights to marry, enter contracts, vote, obtain drivers' licenses,
... enter the courts, hold public offices, obtain adequate education, and...
access to public transportation facilities, as well as access to buildings held
open to the public in general."' As a result, the handicapped have been
denied opportunity and justice under law. "The handicapped are one part
of our Nation that have been denied these fundamental rights for too long."'
Recent statutes have expanded the rights of the handicapped which are
'Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241-68 (relevant sections codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1975a-1975d and 2000 (1970 and Supp. V 1975).
2Comment, Potluck Protections for Handicapped Discriminatees: The Need to Amend
Title VII to Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Disability, 8 LoY. Cm. LJ. 814, 816
(1977). There are still a number of statutes which infringe upon the handicapped person's
rights. Such statutes are similar to the following:
No person who is diseased, maimed, mutilated or in any way deformed so as to be
an unsightly or disgusting object or improper person to be allowed in or on the public
ways or other public places in this city, shall therein or thereon expose himself to public
view, under a penalty of not less than one dollar nor more than fifty dollars for each
offense.
CMCAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 36-34 (1966) (repealed 1974); see Achtenberg, Law and the
Physically Disabled: An Update with Constitutional Implications, 8 Sw. U.L REv. 847, 851
n.9 (1976).
£ 118 CONo. REc. 3322 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Widliams).
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protected by law.' Unfortunately, these statutes do not go far enough. While
they broaden those rights which are protected by law, they do not guarantee
equal opportunity and equal justice for the handicapped. It is important to
anyone's well-being that he be able to exercise the full spectrum of his rights.
Restrictions on the handicapped person's rights force him to "see himself
as an anachronism, for virtually everything his culture offers him is designed
to reinforce his sense of inferiority, to point out to him that he is tolerated
in spite of his stigma.... ." This has a debilitating effect on the handi-
capped person because "[sltigma results in discrimination in the form of
ostracism, feelings of inferiority on the part of the stigmatized persons, and
tendencies by professed normals to 'impute a wide range of imperfections
on the basis of the original one.' ""
The actual stigma placed upon the handicapped person is usually un-
related to the physical handicap. Instead, it is a consequence of the infringe-
ment and denial of the individual's civil rights.
For the most part is is the cultural definition of disability, rather than
the scientific or medical definition, which is instrumental in the ascrip-
tion of capacities and incapacities, roles and rights, status and security.
Thus a meaningful distinction may be made between "disability" and
"handicap"-- that is, between the physical disability measured in ob-
jective scientific terms and the social handicap imposed upon the dis-
abled by the cultural definition of their estate.'
Thus, the real handicap is caused by society's "unwillingness to
permit the disabled to engage in the entire range of possible jobs and the
refusal to grant them 'normal' social interaction that would allow them to
become integrated into the 'normal' society.""
Just as society imposes the handicap upon the disabled, it should accept
the responsibility of eliminating the handicap. Congress recognized this
when it determined that "it is essential that recommendations be made to
assure that all individuals with handicaps are able to live their lives inde-
'See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976); 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (Supp. V 1975); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4151-4156 (1970).
5 Kriegel, Uncle Tom and Tiny Tim - Some Reflections on the Cripple as Negro, 38 AM.
SCHOLAR 412, 426 (1969).
I Hull, The Spector of Equality: Reflections on the Civil Rights of Physically Handicapped
Persons, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 944, 946-47 (1977) (quoting E. GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTEs ON
THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963)).
7 tenBroek & Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CAL. L. REv. 809, 814
(1966).
s Hull, supra note 6, at 946 (quoting C. SAPTLIos-RoTHSCHILD, THE SocIoLooY AND SOCAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF DIsABu.rrY AND REHA ILrrAnoN 4 (1970)).
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pendently and with dignity, and that the complete integration of all indi-
viduals with handicaps into normal community living, working, and service
patterns be held as the final objective... ."I Statutes enacted thus far have
not assured handicapped individuals that they could live independently and
with dignity in normal society. This congressional mandate can only be
fullfilled by amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include the disabled
under its protection.
Current statutes fail to protect the rights of the handicapped in the
areas of access to public facilities, equal employment and education. The
obvious inadequacies of present laws necessitate immediate action, which
could most easily be accomplished through amendment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.
RIGHTS OF ACCESS TO PUBLIC FACILITIES
Access to buildings, transportation systems, and other facilities neces-
sary in everyday life is essential to all individuals. Opportunities to be em-
ployed, entertained, educated, and independent revolve around the ability
to move in society. "Movement... is a law of animal life. As to man, in
any event, nothing could be more essential.., than the physical capacity,
the public approval, and the legal right to be abroad in the land."'1 Liberty
itself consists of the ability to go where one pleases, unfettered by barriers
and restrictions." Recent statutes and court decisions have limited, but have
hardly eliminated, the restraints to access rights which may affect the mobil-
ity of handicapped individuals.
One of the most significant statutes designed to insure the handicapped
individual's right to access is the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.1" Portions of
the Act are designed to "enforce statutory and regulatory standards and
requirements regarding barrier-free construction of public facilities and
study and develop solutions to existing architectural and transportation
barriers impeding handicapped individuals."'" The regulations which deal
with the Rehabilitation Act require that:
Each facility or part of a facility constructed by, on behalf of, or for
the use of a recepient shall be designed and constructed in such man-
9 White House Conference on Handicapped Individuals Act, Pub. L. No. 93-516, tit. III,
§ 301(6), 88 Stat. 1631 (1974).
T 0tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CAL.
L REv. 841 (1966).
1" See Achtenberg, supra note 2, at 865 (quoting I.W. BLACESTONE, COMmENTtmS 230-31
(Jones ed. 1916)).
L2 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-94 (Supp. V 1975).
229 U.S.C. § 701 (11) (Supp. V 1975). See Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d
1277, 1286 (7th Cir. 1977).
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ner that [it] is readily accessible to and usable by handicapped persons,
if the construction was commenced after the effective date of this part."
This mandate is deficient in at least two aspects. First, although all new
federal and federally assisted facilities must be designed so they are readily
accessible to the handicapped individual, there is no corresponding pro-
vision for structures built prior to the Act, unless they are altered for federal
use or altered with federal funds. 5 Second, the regulation only applies to
federal or federally assisted buildings;" most state and all private facilities
are excluded.
State statutes are deficient for similar reasons. Many state statutes re-
quire newly built state buildings and new buildings constructed with state
funds to be accessible to the handicapped. However, these statutes impose
less stringent access requirements upon existing facilities. Few states have
statutes which require the renovation of existing buildings to make them
accessible," while others have statutes which do not specifically require
accessibility when alteration of existing buildings is done." Some do impose
standards which require a limited degree of accessibility when an existing
structure is altered.'"
Some state statutes are weakened because they require modification
only if economically feasible and uncomplicated.2" Still others require that
only one entrance to a building be accessible to the handicapped, 2' a situation
which infringes upon the handicapped individual's civil rights and presents
1445 C.F.R. § 84.23(a) (1977). The cost of providing barrier-free design in new con-
struction has been estimated to be under one-half of one percent of the total cost of the
structure. When structures are renovated, the additional cost is approximately .66 to 2.4%.
See Comment, Access to Buildings and Equal Employment Opportunity for the Disabled:
Survey of State Statutes, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 1067, 1068 (1977).
'5 Each facility or part of a facility which is altered by, on behalf of, or for the use of a
recipient after the effective date of this part in a manner that affects or could affect
the usability of the facility or part of the facility shall ... be altered in such manner
that the altered portion of the facility is readily accessible to and usable by handi-
capped persons.
45 C.F.R. § 84.23(b) (1977).
16 For a definition of the term "building" as covered by this act, see 42 U.S.C. § 4151
(1970).
IT E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 48-02-19 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1455.1 (Purdon Supp.
1978).
"18E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1322 (Supp. 1978); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-10f-2(a)
(1977).
29 E.g., CAL. GOVT. CODE § 4456 (West Supp. 1978); N.Y. PuB. BLDGS. LAw § 50-51
(McKinney Supp. 1977); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3781.111 (Page Supp. 1977). See also
Comment, supra note 14, at 1071.
20 Note, Abroad in the Land: Legal Strategies to Effectuate the Rights of the Physically Dis-
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grave danger to the safety of handicapped persons if a fire or other emer-
gency arises.
Access to these buildings, constructed prior to enactment of state
access statutes, is often more important to the handicapped person than
access to many newer buildings. These older buildings are frequently the
repositories of a wide range of government services and agencies. Those
states which do not require the modification of older buildings effectively
deny the handicapped access to a wide variety of government services. 2
In those states which do not require modification by statute, the altera-
tions can sometimes be accomplished through the courts. In Ohio, a city
councilman was successful in a suit to remove barriers from courthouses
and health and welfare buildings, even though the buildings were built prior
to enactment of the architectural barrier state; his confinement to a wheel-
chair had precluded his access to his own office. In a somewhat similar
case, an elevator was erected in a courthouse upon suit by a resident of
the county."'
Access problems go far beyond the elimination of barriers in buildings.
Not only must buildings be accessible, but transportation systems must also
be accessible for the handicapped person to commute to the buildings. Only
a few states include transportation facilities in their access statutes."
Some courts have held that federally assisted transportation systems
must be accessible to the handicapped. In Bartels v. Biernat,2" the court
held that "by operating a mass transit system which is currently effectively
inaccessible to mobility handicapped individuals and by attempting to pur-
chase one hundred new effectively inaccessible buses so as to knowingly
exclude mobility handicapped individuals from participating in the benefits
of the federally assisted mass transit program,..." the city of Milwaukee vio-
lated the nondiscrimination rights of mobility handicapped persons as declared
in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973."
n Id.
23 Friedman v. County of Cuyahoga, Case No. 895961 (Cuyahoga County Ct., Ohio, 1972).
s6Wargowsky v. Novak, Civil No. c-72-138 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (consent decree).
2 5 E.g., MD. PUBuC WORKS CODE ANN. art. 78A, § 51(i) (1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
22, § 13A (West Supp. 1977); see also Comment, supra note 14, at 1073. Approximately
13,370,000 people have mobility problems. Of those with mobility problems a little over
5,000,000 cannot use transportation systems as they are now constructed. See Achtenberg,
supra note 2, at 866 (citing URBAN MASS TRANSPORTAnON SYSTEmS CENTER, U.S. DPT.
OF TRANSPORTATION, THE HANDICAPPED AND ELDERLY MARKET FOR URBAN MASS TRANSIT
6,7 (1973)). The transbus is a creation of current technology for the effective transportation
of the handicapped. See Hull, supra note 6, at 951.
26427 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.Wis. 1977).
8" Id. at 231.
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To be successful in meeting the needs of the handicapped, a transpor-
tation system must be totally integrated. This includes not only accessible
transportation vehicles but also parking facilities and curb ramping." For
example, Ohio provides special parking spots for the handicapped near state
buildings and in publicly owned parking garages, and all new and recon-
structed curbs must be ramped.29
If statutes do not require accessible transportation systems, the handi-
capped individual can attempt to make the system accessible through an
equal protection argument. Interstate travel has been held to be a funda-
mental right.2 " The Second Circuit has gone one step further, holding that
intrastate travel is also a fundamental right."' Under Shapiro v. Thompson,"
the Supreme Court rejects the rational basis test in determining whether
the Equal Protection Clause has been violated when a fundamental right
is involved. Instead, the Court demands the use of the compelling state
interest test because "appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and
any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless
shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest,
is unconstitutional.""
By arguing (1) that a fundamental right (i.e., the right to travel) has
been abridged because of the inaccessibility of the transportation system,
or (2) that a suspect class has been established (i.e., those who do not have
access to the transportation system because of a handicap)," and (3) that
the requisite state action is present,33 exclusion of the handicapped must be
based upon a compelling state interest rather than upon the easier to justify
rational basis.
28 Comment, supra note 14, at 1073.
2 9 0mo REv. CODE ANN. § 729.12 (Page 1976) provides for ramped curbing; Omo REV.
CODE ANN. § 4511.69(e) & (f) provide for parking locations for the handicapped near
buildings of the state or its political subdivisions and in publicly owned parking garages.
80 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966).
31 Frazier v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir. 1971). The
court explained, "It would be meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as a
fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional
right to travel within a state...."
82394 U.S. 618 (1969).
83.1d. at 634. When a fundamental right is not involved, the handicapped may still make
successful use of an equal protection argument. The compelling state interest test is also
mandated when a suspect class is involved. For a treatment of the handicapped as a suspect
class, see Burgdorf & Burgdorf, Jr., A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of
Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 855 (1975).
84See Note, supra note 20, at 1508.
35 State action must be present for the Equal Protection Clause to apply. Burton v. Wilning-
ton Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
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For the effective integration of the handicapped into society, it is essen-
tial that all barriers be removed. "More people are forced into limited lives
and made to suffer by these man-made obstacles than by any specific physical
or mental disability.""6 Though current statutes have proven insufficient to
remove these barriers, inclusion of the handicapped within the protection
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would be successful. Amendment of Title
II of the Civil Rights Act"' would give the handicapped access to myriad facili-
ties associated with travel and entertainment. 8 "[Section 2000a] declares the
basic right to access to places of public accommodation...."I'
Title I would confer three other benefits which the handicapped do
not currently possess. First, the reach of Title II is as broad as the commerce
power."0 Present statutes generally only apply to federally or state owned
or financed buildings. Protection under Title II would broaden the number
of buildings which would have to be accessible to the handicapped.' 1 Second,
Title H would permit the Attorney General to bring a civil action to enforce
compliance with Title I's requirements. " Third, the protection of Title II
would enable the handicapped to recover attorney's fees.,2 The handicapped
should receive these basic benefits. Title II should be amended to include
the handicapped within its protection.
EQUALIZING EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
A number of federal statutes aid in the employment of the handi-
capped."3 However, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973"4 is probably the most
significant statute concerning the employment rights of the handicapped.
Section 503 (a) of that Act states:
Any contract in excess of $2500 entered into by any Federal depart-
ment or agency for the procurement of personal property and non-
personal services (including construction) for the United States shall
a8Achtenberg, supra note 2, at 848 (quoting Report of the United Nations Expert Group
Meeting on Barrier Free Design, 26 INTERNATONAL REHBILITATioN REv. 3 (1975)).
8T42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to a-6 (1970).
3s42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1970). Some of the facilities which are within the purview of
the Act include hotels, restaurants, theaters, arenas, and gasoline stations, due to their effect
on interstate commerce.
3 9 STATUTORY HMsTORY OF THE UNrrEI STATES 1065 (B. Schwartz ed. 1970) (quoting Report
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) (statement of Rep.
Rodino)).
4042 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) & (c) (1970).
4142 U.S.C. § 2000a-5 (1970).
42 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970).
4 sSee Comment, supra note 2, at 830-33.
"29 U.S.C. 5§ 701-94 (Supp. V 1975).
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contain a provision requiring that, in employing persons to carry out
such contract the party contracting with the United States shall take
affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified
handicapped individuals .... "
The most important aspect of this legislation is that instead of requiring
merely nondiscrimination on the part of employers, it requires affirmative
action toward the employment of the handicapped. This affirmative action
mandate of the Rehabilitation Act requires federal contractors to make
reasonable accommodation to the mental and physical limitations of their
employees or applicants for employment." Furthermore, these affirmative
action practices must extend to all levels of employment, including the
executive level.'" All employment practices must be included in the affirma-
tive action program, including hiring, upgrading, and forms of compen-
sation.'
The affirmative action requirement mandates that the handicapped
not be placed at a competitive disadvantage. The contractor is responsible
for making accommodations in the work environment in order that any
competitive disadvantage resulting from the employee's handicap is elimin-
ated. 9 The required changes will vary from worksite to worksite, depend-
ing largely on the nature of the employee's handicap. 0
The regulations which implement the Rehabilitation Act impose further
affirmative action requirements on those contractors with the federal govern-
ment who hold a contract for $50,000 or more and who employ 50 or more
employees. These contractors are required to prepare and maintain an affir-
mative program, setting forth the contractor's policies and procedures."1 If
followed, this regulation would be an effective method of insuring that these
contractors were following the affirmative action mandate of the Act and
not following a mere nondiscrimination formula. However, effectiveness of
this regulation may be nil as evidenced by a study which discovered that
of a possible 275,000 institutions and corporations which could be affected
by this requirement, less than 300 had filed affirmative action plans.
,5 29 U.S.C. § 793 (Supp. V 1975).
4641 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (1977).
4T41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(a) (1977).
" Id.
49 Note, Affirmative Action Toward Hiring Qualified Handicapped Individuals, 49 S. CAL.
L. Ray. 785, 805 (1976).
o ld. at 809.
5141 C.F.R. § 60-741.5(a) (1977).
a Achtenbcrg. supra note 2, at 882.
[Vol. 12:1
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The Act is further weakened in two other ways. First, contracts for
less than $2500 are not covered by the Act." Second, the affirmative action
requirements can be waived when it is deemed that "special circumstances
in the national interest so require."5'
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides protection for the handi-
capped person in employment and other areas; it is a broad nondiscrimina-
tion provision which states: "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual
in the United States... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance."'"
The Act further provides that no qualified handicapped person shall be
discriminated against in regard to, or excluded from, receipt of any Federal
funds on the basis of inaccessibility.5 If the facility or program is not acces-
sible to the handicapped, the Act requires that only a "reasonable accom-
modation" be made so the handicapped can participate."' These sections of
the Act can hardly protect the rights of the handicapped; only Federal
programs are included, and no reasonable accommodation is necessary if
the accommodation would "impose undue hardship on the operation of
[the] program."5"
Nor do state statutes concerning employment of the handicapped
fully protect the rights of handicapped individuals. Some states have no
statutes dealing with employment of the handicapped.59 Others merely re-
flect a policy of employment of the handicapped, but do not include any
nondiscrimination requirements." Even the state statutes that do contain
nondiscrimination requirements may not be effective because of "exception
clauses" which effectively negate the nondiscrimination requirements. 1
State statutes fail to protect the employment rights of the handicapped
5841 C.F.R. § 60-741.3(a) (1977).
5'41 C.F.L § 60-741.3(b) (1977).
35 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975).
56 45 C.F.R. § 84.21 (1977).
5745 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1977).
Id.
59 Delaware and Colorado are among the states which do not have statutes dealing with
employment of the handicapped. But see GA. CODE ANN. § 89-1702(a) (3) (Supp. 1978)
for an example of a state which recently amended its statutes to protect the employment
rights of the handicapped.
60 See Note, supra note 20, at 1514; see, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 195.180 (Baldwin 1975).
a' Eg., MAss. Gm. LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 24K (West Supp. 1976) and TMENN. CODE ANN.
§ 8-4131 (Supp. 1976) both of which give the employer considerable discretion in his
determination of a handicapped individual's ability.
COMMEN,
9
Ryan: The Rights of the Physically and Mentally Handicapped
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1979
AKRON LAW REVIEW
in three other areas. First, enforcement of the statutes is uneven. 2 Second,
only a few states have laws which prohibit private employment discrimina-
tion."3 Third, even in those states where the handicapped person's employ-
ment rights are covered by statute, the coverage may be inadequate, some
state statutes being of such limited scope that only a few categories of handi-
caps are included in their coverage."' State statutes are also inadequate to
protect the employment rights of the handicapped because of the great
difference in the effectiveness and content of the statutes. No individual's
civil rights should be dependent upon his choice of residence.
In attempting to secure employment rights, the handicapped person
may employ three other arguments. First, an action may be maintained
under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 if there is arbitrary employment discrimination
which (1) deprives the handicapped individual of rights secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) the deprivation is under
color of state law. 5 Second, a "due process/irrebuttable presumption" argu-
ment may secure relief. In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur," the
United States Supreme Court declared that permanent irrebuttable presump-
tions (i.e., physical incompetency based on handicap) are disfavored under
the Due Process Clause."7 When an applicant is refused employment because
of misconceptions on the part of the employer which are based upon stereo-
types and not on the unique characteristics of the applicant, discrimination
under this test exists. This analysis would bring the handicapped individual
under the protection of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Section 504
prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap." Thus while an employer
does not have to hire a handicapped person simply because the person is
handicapped, the employer cannot refuse to hire that person based on stereo-
types concerning his handicap. "Congress has not commanded that the less
qualified be preferred over the better qualified simply because of minority
origins .... What Congress has commanded is that any tests used must
measure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract." 9
62 See Comment, supra note 14, at 1079-81.
63 E.g., Omo Rav. CODE AmN. § 4112.02 (Page Supp. 1977), which prohibits employment
discrimination against the handicapped by "any employer."
64E.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-9 (Supp. 1978), which protects blind individuals, but
offers no protection to any other handicapped persons.
65 See Note, supra note 20, at 1520.
66 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
67 Id. at 644-46. The Court stated that when an irrebuttable presumption "is neither neces-
sarily [nor] universally true", the Due Process Clause is violated if the presumption is used
to infringe upon an individual's right by denying employment. See Comment, supra note 2,
at 828-29.
68 45 C.F.R. § 84.4 (1977).
69 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
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Finally, the two-tiered analysis of the Equal Protection Clause, as used
to protect access rights, may be used in an attempt to secure employment
rights. However, the handicapped individual will not prevail using this argu-
ment in the area of employment unless he can establish himself as a member
of a suspect class. Employment is not a fundamental right; therefore, if the
handicapped do not establish themselves as a suspect class, employers will
be able to justify discrimination using the rational basis test."'
The handicapped need increased protection to guarantee equal employ-
ment rights. Employers are unwilling to hire the handicapped for two
reasons. First, employers fear a loss of productivity, though numerous studies
have shown that the handicapped worker, given a suitable position, per-
forms as well or better than his nonhandicapped coworker. 1 Second, em-
ployers fear an increase in their workmen's compensation rates if they hire
the handicapped, though studies have shown that workmen's compensation
rates are not adversely affected by employment of the handicapped."' In fact,
Ohio uses its workmen's compensation statute so that "employers shall be
encouraged to employ and retain in their employment handicapped
employees." 8
The chief inadequacy of the Rehabilitation Act is that it applies only
to public employment or employment with federal contractors." Therefore,
handicapped individuals are not protected from discrimination by employers
in the private sector. "In view of the fact that presumably the same system
of values regarding civil liberties operates today as in 1964 when the Civil
Rights Act was passed... it is difficult to fathom the lack of congressional
action."' 5
The Rehabilitation Act is inadequate in other areas also. First, there
is no authorization in the Act which would provide for a federal agency
to bring suit on behalf of handicapped individuals who have been discrimi-
nated against. In contrast, Title VII permits the individual, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, and the Attorney General to institute
To See Comment, supra note 2, at 825-26.
71 See Note, supra note 20, at 1513 (citing U.S. Bureau of Labor Standards, Dept. of Labor
Bull. No. 234, Workmen's Compensation and the Physically Handicapped Worker 6-8 (1961)).
T2Statistics indicate that an employer can actually lower insurance rates by hiring handi-
capped workers, as they have had eight percent fewer reported accidents than nonhandi-
capped employees. Note, supra note 20, at 1513 n.84.
T8 OFUo REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.343 (1973 & Page Supp. 1977). Under this statute, the
employer's workmen's compensation rates are not increased if an accident or disease results
because the employee is handicapped. Instead, the employee is compensated out of a special
fund, and the employer's rates are not increased.
4 29 U.S.C. § 793 (Supp. V 1975).
T5 Comment, supra note 2, at 835.
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a civil action to protect employment rights. Further, Title VII permits an
award for attorney's fees;"6 the Rehabilitation Act does not. An amendment
to Title VII would also cure another deficiency common to both the Re-
habilitation Act and state statutes; while the Rehabilitation Act applies only
to those employers associated in some way with the federal government,
Title VH's scope is as broad as the commerce power.77 Also, under this same
provision, Title VII would protect those handicapped individuals who reside
in states that do not have statutes which protect their employment rights
adequately. Title VII would give equal protection to the handicapped indi-
vidual, regardless of his state of residence. No longer would the handicapped
individual's civil rights be dependent upon his choice of residence.
PROTECTION OF EDUCATION RIGHTS
[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments.... In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity
of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken
to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms."8
Despite this mandate, several states still permit the exclusion of the handi-
capped from public education."9 The handicapped may rely on federal
statutes to insure their right to a public education, but the statutes do not
guarantee this right in every situation.
The main source on which the handicapped may rely to secure their
right to an education is section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. While this
Act was originally intended to protect only the handicapped person's em-
ployment rights, the scope of the Act was extended by the Rehabilitation
Act Amendments so that it "became clear that section 504 was intended
to forbid discrimination against all handicapped individuals, regardless of
their need for or ability to benefit from vocational rehabilitation services."10
Section 504 now requires that any locality that receives federal funds
must provide "a free appropriate public education" at both the elementary
and secondary level to every qualified handicapped individual within the
jurisdiction of the locality.8' Ohio also provides for an appropriate education
Is 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. V 1975).
1142 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. V 1975). See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
t Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
TO 118 CONo. REC. 3320 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Wiliams).
8042 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (1977).
Pn45 C.F.R. § 84.33(a) (1977).
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for all handicapped individuals.8 2 State statutes, such as Ohio's, may at
times be necessary to protect the handicapped person's right to an education,
as the federal statute only applies to federal facilities or federally financed
facilities.83 An "appropriate education" as defined by section 504 is "the
provision of regular or special education and related aids and services that
are designed to meet individual educational needs of handicapped persons
as adequately as the needs of nonhandicapped persons are met.... .""'
Two examples of special aids and services which must be provided to
the handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act are taped texts as means of
aiding students with hearing impairments and readers for students with
visual impairments.8" Regardless of the additional expenditures needed to
provide these services to the handicapped, the tuition for the handicapped
student cannot exceed the tuition of the nonhandicapped student."
Court decisions have also enforced the education rights of the handi-
capped student. In Mills v. Board of Education," the court ruled that the
Constitution requires exceptional children to be publicly educated. However,
this decision did not require that handicapped students be educated in the
same environment as nonhandicapped students.88 All that is required is that
"adequate alternative educational services" be provided for the handi-
capped." Under this rationale the handicapped could be educated in com-
plete isolation from the nonhandicapped. This would eliminate the social
integration of the handicapped, though social integration is the only means
available to erase the stigma which society places on the handicapped."0
The Rehabilitation Act rectifies this problem by requiring that handicapped
students be educated in "the regular educational environment operated by
the recipient..." 1 unless education in the regular environment, using special
aids, cannot be achieved satisfactorily."
Another court has held that mentally retarded individuals must have
$2 omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3323.02 (Page Supp. 1977). See Cuyahoga County Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Essex, 411 F. Supp. 46 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
88 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975).
"45 C.F.R. § 84.33 (1977).
-45 C.F.R. § 84.44 (1977).
"645 C.F.R. § 84.33(c) (1977). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969);
Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972).
8 348 F. Supp. 866.
68 See Achtenberg, supra note 2, at 876.
6 348 F. Supp. at 878.
00 See notes 7-9, supra.
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access to free public programs of education." This decision, combined with
the Mills requirement of publicly supported education for the handicapped
wherever public education is supplied to others,' further protect the rights
of the handicapped to a public education.
Additional federal assistance for the education of the handicapped is
contained in the Education of All Handicapped Children Act.9 The most
helpful aspect of this Act is the ability of the states to participate in a
program of federal aid to defray the additional costs associated with edu-
cating the handicapped, the education of the handicapped in the "least
restrictive environment," and the improvement of programs for handicapped
children aged three through five."
Another method which can be used to secure the education rights of
the handicapped involves the two-tiered equal protection analysis." The
Rodriguez decision," on its face, would seem to say that education is not
a fundamental right; therefore, discrimination would be permitted if the
minimal rational basis test was met. 99 However, Rodriguez has been inter-
preted to mean that there is a fundamental right to a minimum level of
education."° Where a minimum level of education is not available to the
handicapped, a fundamental right is involved, and the compelling state
interest test must be used. Furthermore, the compelling state interest test
must be used when retarded children are involved, since it has been deter-
mined that they are a suspect class as a result of their exclusion from the
political process and neglect of their rights by the legislatures. 1 1 Frederick
L. v. Thomas0 2 combined these theories, holding 1) that education is a
quasi-fundamental right, and 2) that disabled children have some of the
characteristics of a suspect class. A "strict rationality" test was used to deter-
mine if the rights of the handicapped were violated.'
,sPennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa.
1971).
4 348 F. Supp. at 875.
"5 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-61 (1976).
9645 C.F.R. § 121-121j (1977); Bureau of Education for the Handicapped, U.S. Dept. of
Health, Education and Welfare, CLosER Loox 1 (1977).
07 See notes 30-35 and accompanying text, supra; see also Haggerty & Sacks, Education of
the Handicapped: Towards a Definition of an Appropriate Education, 50 TEmp. L.Q. 961,
967-80 (1977).
98 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
,9 ld. at 33-35, 40.
100 Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 958 (E.D.Pa. 1975); see Haggerty & Sacks,
supra note 97, at 977.
201 Haggerty & Sacks, supra note 97, at 977.
1902 408 F. Supp. 832 (E.D.Pa. 1976); See Haggerty & Sacks, supra note 97, at 979.
"3 408 F. Supp. at 836.
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There are instances when the education rights of the handicapped are
guaranteed. The compelling state interest test will be used instead of the
easier to meet rational basis test if the handicapped persons can be classified
as a member of a suspect class (i.e., retarded children) or if a fundamental
right is violated (i.e., a minimal education is absent). Also, the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act and the Rehabilitation Act protect edu-
cation rights if a federal program is involved. Some state statutes aid in this
protection.
Nevertheless, Title IV of the Civil Rights Act1 " should be amended
to include the handicapped. Such an amendment would further guarantee
the handicapped of their education rights. First, inclusion of the handicapped
in Title IV would insure the social integration of handicapped students into
a normal education atmosphere because, under section 401 of Title IV, the
handicapped would be assigned to schools without regard to their handi-
cap.105 Second, by including the handicapped student under the protection
of Title IV, those students who live in states which do not currently guaran-
tee the right to a public education in a normal atmosphere would be pro-
tected.' Third, Title IV authorizes the Attorney General to institute a civil
action to protect the rights of those individuals who cannot "initiate and
maintain appropriate legal proceedings."'01
THE NEED FOR CIVIL RIGHTS ACT PROTECTION
"Man is the only animal that laughs and weeps: for he is the only animal
that is struck with the difference between what things are and what they
ought to be."'0 8 The rights of the handicapped in the areas of access, em-
ployment, and education are dependent on matters which are extraneous to
the exercise of a person's civil rights. The exercise of one's civil rights should
not be dependent upon the existence of federal buildings or federal con-
tracts, nor upon the individual's state of residence. To correct these deficien-
cies, the Civil Rights Act should be amended to include the handicapped
within its coverage.
Congress has determined that the Rehabilitation Act reflects a national
commitment to end discrimination on the basis of handicap."' Because of
104 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c to c-9 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
108 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
100 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(c) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
'Of 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
208 See Achtenberg, supra note 2, at 849 (quoting FINAL REPORT OP WScoNsN TASK FORM
ON PROBLEMS OF PEOPLE WITH PHYsICAL HANDICAPs, at 3 (1974)).
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its aforementioned weaknesses, the Rehabilitation Act is incapable of carry-
ing out this national commitment. The best and most feasible means to
immediately eradicate this discrimination is through an amendment to the
Civil Rights Act, adding the handicapped to the litany of classes already
protected by the Act."'
The handicapped should be included under Civil Rights Act protection
for several reasons. Discrimination on the basis of race is forbidden by the
Civil Rights Act. The similarities between racial and handicapped discrimi-
nation dictate that the handicapped be included within the Act. The condi-
tions are so similar that to afford one of them the protection of the Civil
Rights Act and not the other would be unjust."" One court stated that the
label "retarded" carries as great a stigma as derogatory racial remarks.""
Studies have found a significant correlation between negative attitudes
toward the blind and negative racial attitudes."
Analogies between blacks and the handicapped exist in access, em-
ployment, and education areas. While there was a political and legal up-
heaval in the 1960's because blacks and other minorities had to sit at the
back of the bus, "[t]oday, it is realized that a significant minority cannot
even get on the bus" because of access problems. "' Similarly, blacks fought
to put an end to segregated schools because of the inequality that segregated
schools engendered; today, the handicapped seek "the right to obtain the
confidence and productivity which the school systems allowed only to the
nonhandicapped." 5 Finally, just as it is necessary for blacks and whites to
interact in a wide spectrum of social relationships and environments, it is
necessary for the handicapped and the nonhandicapped to interact in these
social settings, including the employment and educational spheres. Segre-
gation of the handicapped from these spheres creates the impression among
the nonhandicapped that the handicapped are inferior." 6 Because of these
similarities between the plight of the black and the handicapped, it has been
said that "Uncle Tom and Tiny Tim are brothers under the skin." '1
110 See Note, supra note 20, at 1502 nn. 8 & 9. Congress has had proposals before it which would
have amended Titles VI and VII for the benefit of the handicapped. No action was taken on
these bills. See H.R. 12,154, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (proposed amendment to Title VI)
and H.R. 10,962, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1972) (proposed amendment to Title VII).
Mll Kriegel, supra note 5, at 416 & 421.
112 405 F. Supp. at 959.
11s Cowen, Underberg & Verrillo, The Development and Testing of an Attitude to Blindness
Scale, 48 J. OF SociAL PsYCHOLOcGY, 297, 304 (1958).
114 Achtenberg, supra note 2, at 850.
-5 Haggerty & Sacks, supra note 97, at 963.
%I' Hull, supra note 6, at 947.
ul Kriegel, supra note 5, at 414.
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Besides the similarities between the experiences of the black and the
handicapped, there are other reasons which support the inclusion of the handi-
capped within the coverage of the Civil Rights Act. "The language of section
504 (of the Rehabilitation Act) is almost identical to the comparable non-
discrimination provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.... It
establishes a mandate to end discrimination and to bring the handicapped
persons into the mainstream of American life."118 Section 504 is not capable
of fulfilling this mandate. Since section 504 is so similar to portions of the
Civil Rights Act, it is logical to amend the Civil Rights Act in order that
the mandate of the Rehabilitation Act be carried out.
The Civil Rights Act was designed so that it would "'package' the
American ideal of equal opportunity into one convenient container."1 9 The
American ideal of equal opportunity is not met unless that "package" in-
cludes the handicapped. There exists precedent for amending the Civil
Rights Act to broaden the classes within its coverage; a 1972 amendment
brought discrimination on the basis of sex into its purview.1 2 0
CONCLUSION
Federal and state provisions designed to insure equal opportunity for
the handicapped are not capable of fulfilling that purpose. These provisions
are pregnant with exceptions, exclusions, and limitations. Only by amending
the Civil Rights Act can the handicapped be guaranteed equal opportunity.
Title II should be amended so that the handicapped person's access
rights to public accommodations are protected. Title VII should be amended
so that employment rights are guaranteed. Title IV should be amended so
that the right to a normal, public education is assured. Also, Title VI should
be amended to insure the protection of the handicapped in federal programs.
The amending process itself would be relatively easy; it would simply in-
volve, for the most part, the insertion of the word handicapped into the
litany of protected classes. The Civil Rights Act would then prohibit dis-
crimination in regard to "race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or
handicap."
PATRICK T. RYAN
11842 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (1977).
'12 Schmidt, Jr., Title VII: Coverage and Comments, 7 B.C. INDuS. & CoM. L REv. 459, 460
(1966).
120 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c, 2000c-6, and 2000c-9 (Supp. V 1975).
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